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THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
TO ENFORCE CHARITABLE USES.
(CONTINUED.)

In the reign of Queen Elizabeth the subject of Charities
attracted more fully than before the attention of the legislature.
It was thought expedient to establish a Board of Commissioners
for Charitable Uses. The first statute regulating the subject is
the thirty-ninth of Elizabeth, chapter six; the second was passed
in the forty-third year of the same reign, chapter four. The true
office and functions of these statutes was not to create a new
authority, but to exercise an already existing jurisdiction in a new
manner. This is shown
1. From their terms andphraseology. The first one shows most

clearly the intention of the legislature. The preamble recites that
charitable gifts, which are enumerated, had been and are still like
to be most unlawfully and uncharitably converted to the lucre
and gain of some few greedy and covetous persons, contrary to
the true intent and meaning of the givers and disposers thereof;
the end of the act being that the uses may from henceforth be
observed and continued according to their true intent. It is then
Yon. 10.-25
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provided, that the Chancellor may award commissions to the bishop
of the diocese and other persons with a jury to inquire of such
gifts and of the abuses, misdemeanors and frauds which have
arisen, &c., so that the intent of the donor cannot be performed.
The statute, 43 Elizabeth, is nearly like the first in its phraseology, although the reasons for enacting it are not so distinctly
stated. This language is so clear in its meaning that Mr. Boyle
says, that the statute professes to be a measure purely remedial,
and that it leaves the original jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery
as before.'
2. The subjects embraced within the statute lead to the same
conclusion. Corporate foundations, as well as those which are
uninccrporated, legal gifts, as well as those which are equitable,
are provided for. Thus a statute passed in the eighteenth year of
Queen Elizabeth's reign2 had exempted all manner of conveyances
to the use of the poor from the statutes of mortmain, and had
expressly enacted that it should be lawful to give to any person or
corporation for their benefit, and yet the poor are mentioned in
these acts in the same connection with other gifts and appointments of a charitable nature. These statutes apparently establish
a power of visitation. There is no word or line in them which
purports to create a new capacity to take property. When the
legislature intended to give capacity they knew how to express
themselves, as will be seen in the 18th Elizabeth just cited, explained by an act passed in the 39th Elizabeth, c. 5, immediately
preceding one of those in question.
8. The decisions of the courts sustain this view. "1Thus," says
Duke, "the Commissioners cannot by their decree make a corporation not before incorporated, and enable them to take charitable
uses as a corporation." They may, however, cause trustees to
convey, from time to time, so as to keep up the number originally
appointed. This, as has been seen, could have been done by the
Court of Chancery without reference to the statute.3 It is true
1 Boyle on Charities, p. 12.
2 18 Elizabeth, c. 8, J 9.

3

Arnold vs. Barker, supra, p. 839.
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that an unwarrantable extent was given to uses defectively created
in point ofform. This was through a forced construction of the
words "given, limited, appointed, and assigned," employed in the
statute in respect to the methods in which charities were created,
and especially of the word "limited."
The word "limited"
enlarged the power of disposition,' and the statute of wills, as well
as of mortmain, 'was, pro tanto, repealed or modified. But no
statement is to be found that a new capacity to take property was
created in the devise beyond modifying the restrictions of those
statutes. No decision, it is believed, can be found, where the Commissioners were held to have acquired a power to establish a use
which, before the statute of charities, by the general rules of equity
jurisprudence would have been intrinsically void, nor does any case
adjudged by the Commissioners go farther than Symond's case,
before noticed. 2 Many defective methods of raising a valid use
were, however, sanctioned. The peculiar cases arising under this
statute were of this class. Damus' case was a will of personal
property made by a married woman, who was administratrix. The
will was void at law, because a married woman cannot make a
will, but good by the statute of charities. It was her duty, as
administratrix, to appropriate the property to pious uses.3 Collison's case was a will made seven years before the statute of wills,
to a charitable use. It was held to be a good "limitation" under
the statute of charitable uses.4 Many similar'cases might be cited.
On the question of capacity of unincorporated persons to take a
charitable use, as devisees, the decisions do not appear to be dif,
ferent after the statute from those made before.
4. A similar conclusion may be derived from the nature of the
Commissioners' authority. Matters appear to have come before the
Chancellor, to have.been in part disposed of by him, and then to
have been referred to the Commissioners. 5 They were not an
independent tribunal. It is true they could make a decree, but
could not enforce it if it were disobeyed. They must call on the
1 Boyle on Charities, p. 18.

4 Moor's Rep. p. 888.

P. 339, supra.
3 Sir F. Moor's Reports, p. 822.

5 Duke on Charitable Uses, 50.
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Chancellor to imprison the recusant party.' If they issued a summons to a party, and he refused to attend, they certified the fact
to the Lord Chancellor. This functionary expressly declared in
one case, as a reason why the party should appear before them, that
otherwise the breach of trust would go unpunished, unless in Nhaneery, which were a tedious and chargeable suit for poor persons.'
The object of the commission, probably, was to save expense by
causing a summary inquiry to be made with a jury in the counties
where the property given to charities was situated. It proved to
be a piece of cumbrous machinery, and soon fell into disuse.
5. It was wholly in the discretion of the Chancellor to do what
he saw fit in respect to their decrees. "Thus," says Moore, "it
is in the breast of the Chancellor to award the commissions, or to
confirm or annul the decrees, by which he can prevent or avoid
their multiplicity perfectly well." It will be remembered that
3
Moore penned the statute of charities.
6. Shortly before the time of Queen-Elizabeth it had been customary for the crown to issue special commissiong to bear equity
causes. This practice, originating in the reign of Henry VIII.,
was greatly resorted to at the close of the Queen's reign, on
account ofethe illness of the Master of the Rolls, and the pressing
nature of the Lord Chancellor's engagements. The Chancellor
himself made similar delegations of authority, which were greatly
complained of, and were the subject of a statute. These were only
delegations of cases which the Chancellor could have heard if he
had seen fit.' The statute commission of 43 Elizabeth is thus
readily accounted for. It would have been simply impossible for
the Chancellor to have heard the cases in the respective counties,
and on so important a subject it was desirable that a commission
should have the sanction of a statute. Besides, as the inquiry was
to be by jury, legislation was absolutely essential.
For these reasons, among others, it is submitted that there is
no reason to believe that the law of charities rests upon the statute
of Elizabeth.
1 Duke on Charitable Uses, 158.

3 Rivett's Case, Moore's R. 890.

2Duke 69, 5 Car. . Original edition.

4 Hargrare, Law Tracts, 310.
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Informations in Chancery.
The question whether an indefinite charitable gift could have
been enforced prior to the 43d Elizabeth by means of an information filed in Chancery by the Attorney-General, has elicited much
discussion. This question is important in its bearing upon charitable gifts which were not valid at law. There is some direct evidence that such a proceeding was adopted. Probabilities are also
in its favor. The reasons for this conclusion are,
I. Informations by a public officer were proper proceedings in
Chancery long before the statute of Elizabeth. This might be
inferred from the general analogies to be derived from proceedings
in other courts, and can be shown by authority. Thus, in the
Year Book, 1 H. VII., 18, it is said, that in certain cases, when a
trespass is committed and an information is made in Chancery, a
writ will issue for the farmer of the King and thus he will have
the assistance of the King.
So in another case, 1 the Attorney of the King asked the Court
to establish, by "mere surmise," the right of the King against
one who was claimed to be seised to his use. It was urged in
opposition, that the King should have his remedy by subpoena and
not in this manner. The Chancellor agreed with this view, and
said that, as the matter touched the Commonwealth of the realm
for all time to come, a subpoena was necessary. The AttorneyGeneral must have proceeded in such a case by an information.
In fact, at the close of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, informations had become so common that it was necessary to make a public statement that they did not abate by her death. All the
Judges resolved that informations for the Queen in any "Latin
Court," should not abate, but should be continued, and that all informations in the "English Courts" do not abate, because no continuances were necessary. It is superfluous to add that, the
"Latin Courts" mean the Common Law Courts, and the "English
2
Courts" embrace the Court of Chancery.
I Year Book, 4 11. VII. 5, case 10.
23Moore's Reports, p. 748. Demise le Boy.
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Informations in Chancery were absolutely necessary to enforce
a use in behalf of the King. The King could, as is well known,
take a use. Thus Empson and Dudley were seised to the use of
the King.' So Crompton says, "If one is enfeoffed to the use
of the King, he shall have a subpcena, and though he is a politic
body, he can take a use." 2 He must therefore have taken it in
his public capacity, or as representing the public. No reason can
be perceived why he could not take a charitable use which is public in its nature. All the King's Courts were open to him, and
he had his election in which of them to sue, according to the
nature of the case. 3 This is the rule at the present day. A legal
right on the part of the public to a charitable use, can be enforced
by information in Chancery.- A petition was filed in Chancery
in the time of Henry VIII., by W. Whorehood, Attorney-General.!
II. An information in Chancery could be used to establish a
title to wardship, and to determine what person should have the
care of infants, at least of the "King's infants." The King was
interested as "parens patrim" in watching over"those who were
unable to protect themselves. It will be observed that this proposition bears closely upon our subject, for if the right of the infant
could be in this manner established, no reason can be given why
the royal protection should be withheld from the poor.
In the Year Book, 1 Ed. V., p. 6, an information of this kind
was filed, upon which a subpoena was granted in the regular course
of Chancery procedure. The case came before the Bishop of Lincoln, Chancellor, and Choke and Catesby, Justices. The information was filed by Townsend, Sergeant of the King, 'and it was
stated to the Court, that one William Fowler, being possessed of
the wardship of the body and the land of one S., granted his right
to Davis, whose estate was confirmed by letters patent from the
King. Pole, the defendant, having possession of the ward, was
required by subpmna to bring him before the King in his Chan4 Attorney-General vs. Galway, 1 Molloy, 103.
, Statutes 1 H. VIIL chap. 15.
5 Hargrave's Law Tracts, 312.
2 Jurisdiction of the Courts, p. 54.
3Year Book, 39 H. VI. 26, case 36.
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cery. At the return day, Pole appears by his counsel, and
claimed that the information was not sufficient to compel him to
bring in the ward's person. It appeared in the discussion that the
information was not sufficient, and the Justices state what it is
necessary to show in order that the possessor of the ward shall be
placed upon his defence. At that time, it seems if an "office"
had not been found for the King, it must have been stated in the
information, that the infant's ancestor had died in the homage of
the King, or that the King had been in possession of the person
of the ward. It was said by Choke, J., that such an information
could be made by parol; that the party who filed it,' that is, tAe
guardian in fact, can amend by parol a written information, and
that when it becomes sufficient, the opposite party must respond.
Then the ward is delivered to the Court, and the Court, who is
"the third person," shall deliver him to one of the Masters in
Chancery, in the custody of the Lord Chancellor, until the right
is determined. 2 We are, unfortunately, deprived of an account
of the rest of the case, because on the adjourned day "Richard
Plantagenet claimed to be King of England, and on the same day
proclaimed the day of his coronation, by force of which all the
Courts of England were discontinued." The case proves, that
informations were used to establish title to wardship ; that the
guardian in fact, claiming title, controlled the proceedings by
making use of the name of the King. If was substantially a
question between one supposed guardian and another. The reasons
given for the interference were undoubtedly narrow.3 The fact
remains, that in certain cases, on general principles of equity
jurisprudence, an information was proper to establish title to a
ward. It is now settled that the jurisdiction of the Court is
exercised by the Chancellor, as a part of the general delegation
Nearly every principle now
1 Such a person would now be called "relator."
applied to informations in Chancery, is found in these old cases.
2 The subject is spoken of by Choke as though it were perfectly familiar law.
There is proof that he was well acquainted with the rules prevailing in Chancery.
3 Dower could, at that time, be recovered in Chancery only in the case of "King's
widows," or those whose husbands held directly of the King. Year Book 1 ff. VII.
18; 4 Id. 1.
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of the authority of the Crown by virtue of his office, without any
special warrant.'
The statement of Sir Joseph Jekyll seems, therefore, warranted
by way of analogy. Speaking of the power of the King over
infants, he says, "In like manner, in the case of charity, the
King, pro hono publico, has an original right to superintend the
care thereof, so that, abstracted from the statute of Elizabeth
relating to charitable uses, and antecedent to it, as well as since,
it has been every day's practice to file informations in Chancery,
2
in the Attorney-General's name, for the establishment of charities.
Lord Somers had said before him, that there were several things
which belonged to the King as pater patrie, and fell under his
3
care and direction, as infants, charities, &c.
III. A like inference is to be drawn from the practice in the Star
Chamber and Court of Wards. Crompton continually illustrates
Star Chamber practice by that in Chancery. The defendant was
called into that Court by subpena.1 Cases were presented on bill
or information to the Chancellor, for the King.5 "When the proceeding was between one individual and another, it was by bill in
analogy to suits in Chancery; in other cases, by information.
The forms of practice are so much alike, that Crompton continually makes reference from one to the other. "For commission of
rebellion, (see Chancery)." 6 A case of charitable uses was presented in the Star Chamber in the forty-fourth year of Elizabeth,
concerning the poor of a parish. 7 This could not have been done
under the statutes of Elizabeth, for the Star Chamber is not mentioned in the act, and must, as it would seem, have taken place by
information, according to what has already been said of the sys'Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Redfield's Edition, 1861, and cases cited.
2Eyre vs. Shaftesbury, 2 P. Wins. 119.
3
4
5
6

Cary va. Bertie, 2 Vern. 342.
Crempton on the Jurisdiction of the Courts, written in 1594, p. 29.
Id. p. 34. See bill on information al Chauncellor pur le roy.
Id. p. 32.

7 Banister's Case in the Star Chamber, 44 Eliz.; Duke on Charitable Uses, Moor's
Reading, 139.
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tem of practice. The case was as follows: a gift was made to a
parson and his successors to the use of the poor of the parish; the
parson made a lease for thirty years; the lessee did not perform
the use, and the poor made an entry. It was resolved that the
gift was good, and that the lease for so many years was good also,
notwithstanding the statute 13 Eliz. cap. 10,1 because it could not
tend to the impoverishment of the parson's successor, insomuch
as it was given to a charitable use. This shows that the Court
established the use, and also that it was regarded as a trust in the
parson. Most of the Star Chamber cases of this kind would be
decided by the Chancellor without assistance.
So in the Court of Wards, 2 informations were employed to
establish uses in favor of infants who were wards of the King or
Queen. The ordinary process in that Court was by bill, when an
infant's rights were to be protected by information filed by the
King's Attorney. In this manner the infant obtained a decree
establishing his right against feoffees.3
IV. The policy and condition of England were altogether favorable to the enforcement of every gift in charity. At an early
peridd there was an opportunity to test the principles of English
Kings and Barons upon this topic.. The great military order of
Knights Templars had been dissolved, and the question arose
whether the lands which had been given to them for the defence
of the church and for "liberal alms-giving," (largitionem magnificam) should escheat to the King and divers other lords. The
judges had been asked whether these lords could retain these
lands by the law of the realm, and with safe conscience. They
had warily and cautiously replied that they could retain them by
1 This statute prevented parsons, among others, from making leases in such a

manner as to impoverish their successors.

Any lease made by them could not

exceed twenty-one years.
2 This Court was created in the reign of Henry VIII. (32 Id. c. 46), to take over-

sight of the affairs of infants, "natural fools," &c., and this class of cases were
withdrawn from Chancery while that Court continued.
3 Boydell vs. Walthall, 33 and 34 Eliz., 2Ioor Rep. 722; Georges vs. Stanfield,
Id. 718; Forster's Case, Id. 717.
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the law of the realm. Upon a great conference, it seemed good
to these noblemen assembled in Parliament, for the health of their
souls, and for the discharge of their consciences, that these lands
should not escheat nor pass by inheritance to private persons, but
that they should be devoted forever to the pious uses for which
they were originally granted. The titles which had already vested
at law were divested by this act,' and the lands were conferred
upon the Brethren of the "Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem" to
the same uses for which they were originally granted. This is a
clear instance of the application of the principles of equity jurisprudence concerning charities. The great trusts were not to fail
for want of a trustee. It is true that the power of Parliament
was invoked, but the boundaries between the jurisdiction of the
Courts of Equity and Parliament in respect to uses, were not
closely drawn for a century or more afterwards. So, says Mr.
Boyle, "when we find in books of ancient date applications talked
of to Parliament, we naturally at the present day transfer our
ideas to Courts of Equity as the more appropriate tribunals." 2
The same principle was applied by the Court of Chancery in
England at our revolution, when the College of William and Mary
in Virginia had passed under our control.

The college having

ceased to be an English corporation, s a new arrangement was
made in respect to charitable trusts previously held by it.
The condition of England for centuries made it her imperative
duty to provide for the poor. Statutes were continually passed
to arrest the evils growing out of the fact that "stalwart and
valiant beggars" imposed upon the public, and" the unfortunate
poor had no means of support. A list of the statutes from the
earliest period to the time of James I., will be found in our note.'
117 Ed. II., stat. 2, A.D. 1324; 1 Statutes of the Realm, 194.
2 Boyle on Charities, 267. See also 1 Spence Eq. Jurisd. 332.
3 Attorney-General vs. Mayor of London, 1 Brown Ch. Cas. 171.
4 See 23 E. III. c. 7 ; 7 R. II. c. 5 ; 12 do. c. 7, 8, 9, 10; 11 H. VII. c. 2; 19 do.
c. 12; 22 H. VIII. c. 12; 27H. VIII. c. 2.5; 28 H. VIII. c. 6; 31 H. VIII. c. 7;
33 H. VIII. c. 17; 37 H. VIII. c. 23; 1 Ed. VI. c. 3; 14 EIiz. c. 5; 39 Eliz. c. 4;
43 Eliz. c. 9.
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The statesmen of that time were busily occupied with the perplexing problems concerning the care of the poor, even before the
dissolution of the Monasteries. The first statute of Henry VIII.
regarding them, was passed five years before any of the Monasteries were dissolved. The preamble speaks of "the great and
excessive number of vagabonds and beggars." The second statute,
passed before even the smaller Monasteries were broken up, provided for the collection of alms to be gathered upon every holy
day or festival day by the churchwardens, for the poor and impotent sick, and no money was to be given in alms except so far as
it was contributed in this way. All persons who were bound to
pay sums in behalf of the poor could legally dispose of it in this
manner. The statute is very extended and detailed, and shows
that the dissolution of the Monasteries could not have been the
cause of the beggary of the country, though it undoubtedly aggravated it.1 Is it reasonable to suppose during this long period of
years, while the State was straining every nerve to support the
poor, teasing and compelling the people to be benevolent, allowing
no Sunday of the year to elapse without a contribution in their
behalf; can it be supposed, we say, that devises or legacies to
this unfortunate class should be left without enforcement ? It is
morally certain that legislation would not have been delayed so
long if there were no remedy by judicial decree. Donors of
charities must have known, or must have supposed that a judicial
remedy existed. Thus, in the year 1572, land was granted for
charitable purposes to several fcoffees, on their failure to such
persons as the lord keeper should decree upon complaint, and on
their failure, to the use of the Crown to grant the same to charitable
uses.2 Unless the Court of Chancery had an inherent jurisdiction
upon this subject, can we imagine such a will to be made twentyfive years before the statutes of Elizabeth ? The language seems
to indicate the two-fold remedy by bill and information.
The'statutes of Chantries cannot be urged against this view.
1 Froude in his excellent view of the state of England at this period, takes this

view. 1 Hist. pp. 74-84.
2 Endowed Charities of London, p. 141.
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Their object was to vest property given to superstitious uses in the
Crown. It is true that the languageof the first one, passed in the
reign of Henry VIII., was far more sweeping. It would appear
from its phraseology to have been the object to vest all charities
in the King. This, however, was not the true intent of the legislature. Froude well explains it. The minds of men had been
thrown into such a ferment by the dissolution of the monasteries,
that they were seeking to resume all the property which they had
previously devoted to charitable uses, &c. It was therefore a
measure of policy to vest this property in the King, subject to a
re-appropriation of it by him to charitable purposes.' The truth of
this statement is evinced by the later statutes passed in the reign of
Edward VI. and Elizabeth. 2 In these acts, the rights of the poor to
any endowments were carefully protected, and in the latter one the
Queen was authorized to convert property given for superstitious
uses to charitable purposes. The ostensible design of the act was
to reform charities, not to confiscate them. As Lord Coke says,
in arguing Porter's case, "No time was so barbarous as to abolish
learning, nor so uncharitable as to prohibit relieving the poor."
The decisions of the courts always conformed to this view; they
distinguished between good and superstitious uses in the same
instrument. 3 So, if a charitable and superstitious use were connected, and the principal object was charitable, it was upheld.
Thus, where the use, upon a devise made in 12 H. VI., was to
sustain poor men to pray for the soul of the dead, it was held that
though the direction was superstitious, the use for the poor must
be supported, and that it was valid.'
The inference is, that charitable uses of all kinds were established and enforced. There was a method in the law by which
they could be established, and every inducement in the facts of
England's condition to cause the method to be put in exercise.
1 4 Hist. 486, 487.
2 1 Ed. VI. c. 14; 1 Eliz. c. 24, sec. 10.
3 Partridge vs. Turk, Moor, 693, 38 Eliz..; Porter's Case, 1 Coke, 226.
4 Case of the Skinners of London, 24 and 25 Eliz., in the Exchequer, Moor IL.
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The bearing of an authority showing that informations were used
for the purpose of establishing charitable uses, may now be appreciated. It consists in a statement made by Sir Francis Moor, who
penned the statute 43 Eliz., and whose "Reading" upon it is of
the highest authority. He says: "There is given to the Lord
Chancellor a directory, declaratory, additionary and compulsory
power by this statute, which he may exercise upon complaint by a
party grieved, that the commissioners have not pursued their
authority. A party grieved is whosoever hath bonum omissum,
or malorum commissum, by the decree, whosoever is interested,
and hath a property and ownership of goods and lands to his own
use-whosoever, by the decree, hath prejudice either in law or
equity-is 'party grieved,' and may complain by bill." On examining the statute, it will be found that this is a correct exposition
of it. The language is, that "a party grieved may proceed by
bill." Sir Francis Moor proceeds: "But where the prejudice is
common or general, there every man may complain as an amicus
curio, not as a party grieved, as where lands are given to repair
bridges or highways, which are public easements, any man may
complain if the decree limit the use to any other purpose.' It will
be observed that he does not say that this method is given by the
statute, and it is not to be found there. No one is provided for
in the statute but the party grieved. The remedy by complaint,
as "anmcus curice," must therefore have previously existed.
Now, complaint by any one, as amicus ourio, is an information.
Thus it was said in an early case in the Exchequer Chamber, by
all the Judges, that any man can show a fact in a proper case to
any Court which the King has, as amicus curice, or amicus jurs,
and every man can inform the Court, &c. And the Chancellor
said, speaking of the case then before the Court, where the insufficiency of an office is evident, any man has a right to present the
matter as amicus curio, but where it is not evident, then no one
can present it except the party grieved, taking the same distinction in the year 1468 which was taken in reference to his own
I Moor's Reading on the Statute of Charitable Uses, Duke, 167.
also to be found in the Appendix to Boyle on Charities.

The reading is
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Court nearly one hundred and fifty years later.' The information
could be made either to the Justices or to the King's Attorney.
Thus proclamation was made that if any one wished to inform the
Justices or the Serjeants of the King for the King, they should be
heard. 2 Sir Francis Moor then means to state that a charitable
use of a general nature could be presented to the Court of Chancery
by information, where the Commissioners had made.an erroneous
decree in establishing a charity. This statement is nearly contemporaneous with the statute of Elizabeth, for Moor wrote within
less than seven years after it was enacted. Duke makes a statement, that an information was a proper proceeding as an original
method in Chancery, to enforce a charitable use. It is common
to treat his statement as of little value, because it was made many
years after the statute of Elizabeth, but the authority of a contemporaneous writer of Moor's special ability in this particular
branch of the law, cannot thus be discarded.
Symond's case 3 must have been decided upon similar principles.
There was no trustee, because the bargain and sale was void for
want of enrolment. 4 It was the case of a charity enforced after
the statute of uses and before 43 Elizabeth, where no trustee was
named, and must have been by information.
If any one denies that the Court had an original jurisdiction of
this kind, he may be pertinently pressed with the question, when
did the remedy by information in cases of charity arise? It has
been shown that informations were known to early equity jurisprudence; that they were used to establish uses for the King;
that rights of wardships were also acted upon, and uses belonging
to infants in ward were thus enforced; that some charitable uses
were established against the heir, which could have been enforced
in no other way; that they were numerous enough at the close of
the reign of Queen Elizabeth to justify a resolution by the Judges;
that they were not mentioned in the statute of Blizabeth, but were
1Year Book, 7 Ed. IV. 16, case 11.
2 Year Book, 20 H. VL 38. The reporter adds, "But no one came."
3 P. 339, supra.
4 Statute 27 H. VIII. c. iv. 5.
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at once employed to correct erroneous decrees made by Commissioners in establishing charities, and a few years later were
common for the purpose of establishing charitable uses. Is there
any other instance in the law in which a remedy sprung suddenly
into existence ? Are not all other remedies, unless given directly
by statute, clearly of a historic character ?
Finally, it is no slight argument in favor of this view, that the
dicta of so many distinguished English Judges may be found in its
favor. Though not authority, they are valuable as representing
the traditions which had come down to them. Among these we
find the names of Justice Bridgman, Lord Somers, Sir Joseph
Jekyl, Lord Northington, Lord Eardwicke, Justice Wilmot, Lord
Redesdale, and Lord St. Leonards. On the other side is Lord
Loughborough, who mainly relies upon the negative evidence of
Porter's case. In that case land had been devised to A upon
condition to perform a charitable use. The condition was broken,
by making a lease, and the heir of the devisor entered for the
breach, and conveyed to the Queen, for the purpose of having the
charity enforced, as some think, though apparently without reason.
The Queen then brought an information in the Court of Exchequer,
against the lessee, for intrusion. It is urged that if the remedy
by information in Chancery had then existed, it would have been
selected by the Queen's advisers instead of this circuitous process.
It must, however, be remembered, that the heir had a legal right
to enter for breach of a condition concerning charities. This right
was given by an express statute already referred to.' It does nbt
appear that he intended to have thb charity enforced, but probably
meant to claim his strict right. No trace of the present existence
of the charity (Nicholas Gibson's) is to be found in the book called
"Endowed Charities of London." If, then, all the weight is given
to Porter's case which can possibly be claimed for it, it does not
contradictthe authorities or invalidate the arguments urged upon
the other side of the question. 2 Even after the statute of Eliza1 13 E. I., c. 41.
2 Lord Loughborough seems to talk at random of this case.
He says the cause
was tried upon an cefctment brought by the heirs, when the proceeding was insti-
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beth the heir could enter for breach of condition in cases of
charitable uses. As it could not, for that reason, be urged that
there was then no other method of procedure, so Porter's case
does not prove that the method adopted there was the only one
practicable.'
On the whole, we may safely agree with Lord Redesdale, when
he says, in substance, that the King, as parens patrie, calls upon
his courts of justice to take care of those who cannot take care
of themselves; not only of infants, but of the sick and impotent
poor.2 This is done in the regular course of judicial procedure.
It is commonly stated by the writers of text books, that gifts to
unincorporated bodies are not to be enforced by the Court of Chancery as such unless a trustee is interposed, and a passage from Lord
Eldon's opinion in the case of Moggridge vs. Tkaclwell, 3 Vesey
85, is usually cited to sustain this view: "The general principle
thought most reconcilable to the cases is that where there is a general indefinite purpose, not fixing itself upon any object, as this in a
degree does, (meaning the case before him,) the disposition is in the
King by sign manual; but where the execution is to be by a trustee,
with general or some objects pointed out, then the court will take
the administration of the trust." Lord Eldon's meaning has been
misapprehended. He was endeavoring to distinguish between cases
where the intention of the testator could not be ascertained, and
where it could be determined by judicial interpretation. Thus he
said, in the same connection, that the will was in that case in a degree
dtfinite. The language of the will was, that the "executor was to
dispose of the property in such charities as he thought fit, recommending poor clergymen who have large families and good characters." If such language is "in a degree definite," it is not difficult to understand what he meant by "an indefinite purpose." In
another passage of the same judgment he says: "When money is
given to charity generally, without trustees or objects selected, the
tuted on behalf of the Queen.

He must have explained Porter's case without
examining it. Attorney-General vs. Bowyer, 3 Yes. 726.
1 Berd vs. Robinson, New Benloe Rep. 171, (2 Car.)
2 Id., 1 Bligh N. 8. 347.

TO ENFORCE CHARITABLE USES.

King is constitutional trustee," thus intimating that where either
was designated, the charity could be enforced by the court. Besides,
if he had any other meaning, his statement is not exhaustive, for he
does not include in his propositions, in any form, the case where the
object was measurably definite, such as the poor of a parish, and no
trustee was selected. This can be readily perceived by a careful
perusal of the passage.' The reporter undoubtedly has failed to give
his exact language. The passage perhaps should read, "except
that where the execution is by a trustee, with general or some
objects pointed out, the court will execute the trust." The statement is then symmetrical, consistent with other parts of the judgment, in harmony with his main argument, and is confined to
general and indefinite gifts. His proposition is at best a mere
dictum, to which undue weight has been attached, for he lays no
stress upon it himself, and is characteristically dissatisfied with
it. The authorities and the reason of the thing are essentially
opposed to the idea that a trustee is necessary. There is a crowd
of decisions that sustains the doctrine, that if a trustee dies before
the testator, or is removed before his death, the court will execute
the trust, though only the shadow remains. 2 Is it, then, reasonable, if the intent was clear and no trustee happened to be
named, that a different conclusion should be reached? Truly,
as Justice Wilmot says, "that would be too fine a thread to hang
this matter upon." 3 But there are distinct authorities both before
and after the statutes of Elizabeth in favor of holding the heir as
trustee. Nothing can be more decisive than Symond's case before
noticed. The followiig cases, after the statute, have been noted:
A testator had appointed that lands and goods should be sold for
charitable uses, but did not say by whom the sale should be made;
the sale was decreed. 4 This took place under the first statute.
The result after the statute was precisely the same as that in
Symond's case before. So where a devise was made to a curate,
1 Mfoggridge vs. Thackwell, p. 83.

The cases are collected in Hill on Trustees, 451.
Wilmot's Opinions, p. 23.
4 Steward vs. Germyn, 41 Eliz., Duke, 79, case 22.
VoL. 10.-26
2
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and to all that should serve the cure after him, though the curate
was not able to take by devise, for want of being incorporate, and
having succession, yet the Lord Chancellor (Nottingham) decreed
that the heir of the devisor should be seised in trust for the curate
for the time being.' Other cases have been cited of a similar
nature. As soon as the trust was established, the court could
regulate the charity and appoint new trustees from .time to time,
2
decreeing new conveyances.
When the charity is purely indefinite, such as the poor at large,
and no trustee is interposed, it can only be enforced by the exercise of prerogative power. Upon whatever theory the English
monarch delegates this power to the chancellor, it clearly could not
be adopted under our system of jurisprudence. The function of
the courts is to ascertain the meaning of the testator by well-settled
rules of interpretation. When the intention cannot be learned in
this manner, their duty is at an end; conjecture is not to take the
place of science. When interpretation ends, prerogative begins;
but this authority is not to be assumed by the courts. Similar
reasons would cause us to discard that peculiar cy pres doctrine by
which funds given in support of a charity, in case that it is illegal
or impracticable, are perverted from the design of the founder,
under pretence of observing his general intention. Though this
was the rule at common law, the "general intention" of the
testator is not, as a matter of principle, the subject of judicial
cognisance. But no difficulties, growing out of a want of corporate
capacity or of the want of a technical trustee, should stand in the
way of effectuating the well-ascertained intention of the donor.
When the charity is altogether indefinite, it is not enforced even
in England.3
(TO BE CONCLUDED IN THE NEXT NUMBER.)

12 Ventris, 349. In Chancery.
Hill on Trustees, passim.

2

3 The cases of this kind are collected in 13 Beavan, 89, 90, 91.

